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THE PROTECTED PROFITS BENCHMARK:
RESPONSES TO COMMENTS
STEVEN C. SALOP*
I am pleased to have this opportunity to respond to the thoughtful com-
ments by Professor Richard Gilbert,1 Dr. Su Sun,2 and Dr. Timothy Tardiff3
on my article4 on refusals to deal and price squeezes. In my article in this
Journal, I sought to clarify the proper price standard for determining whether
or not a vertically integrated monopolist (VIM)5 is engaged in a refusal to deal
or price squeeze in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. The determina-
tion of the legal price standard for anticompetitive refusal to deal and price
squeeze allegations is an important issue and one that has become seriously
contorted in light of the Supreme Court’s opinion in linkLine.6
In many cases, the proper price standard will be the price that the VIM
charges other non-competing firms or previously charged the excluded com-
petitor. However, where these market benchmarks do not exist or do not ap-
ply, I proposed the “Protected Profits Benchmark” (PPB) as an alternative
price standard.7 Such a price involves profit-sacrifice, which suggests an-
* Professor of Economics and Law, Georgetown University Law Center; Senior Consultant,
Charles River Associates. I would like to thank Greg Leonard, Serge Moresi, and Rich Gilbert
for their helpful comments.
1 Richard Gilbert, The Protected Profits Benchmark: A Refusal to Deal Metric?, 78 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 689 (2013).
2 Su Sun, The Protected Profits Benchmark: Precision Versus Adminstrability, 78 ANTITRUST
L.J. 703 (2013).
3 Timothy J. Tardiff, The Protected Profits Benchmark: Input Price, Retail Price, or Both?,
78 ANTITRUST L.J. 719 (2013).
4 Steven C. Salop, Refusals to Deal and Price Squeezes by an Unregulated, Vertically Inte-
grated Monopolist, 76 ANTITRUST L.J. 709 (2010) [hereinafter Salop, Refusals to Deal].
5 Dr. Tardiff refers to the VIM as a VIP (“vertically integrated provider”). Tardiff, supra note
3, at 719. Dr. Sun refers to the VIM as a VIF (“vertically integrated firm”). Sun, supra note 2, at R
703. I prefer VIM to stress the fact that the antitrust issue only arises if the defendant is a
monopolist.
6 See Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
7 See generally Salop, Refusals to Deal, supra note 4, at 720–23 (discussing the protected R
profits benchmark price).
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ticompetitive animus.8 When products are homogeneous, a wholesale price
that violates this price standard would exclude an equally efficient entrant. As
a result, there will be less competition in the downstream (output) market in
which the entrant is trying to compete. It also could lead to a reduced likeli-
hood of future entry and competition in the input market.9 The PPB price
standard is, therefore, a conservative starting point for an antitrust analysis
that also requires the plaintiff to prove that the resulting refusal to deal or
price squeeze would harm consumer welfare.10
The derivation of the paradigmatic version of the PPB can be illustrated
with the following numerical example. Suppose that the VIM and entrant sell
a homogeneous product. Suppose that they have the same technology, which
uses one unit of the VIM’s input for every unit of output produced. In this
case, the PPB is equal to the well-known “Efficient Component Pricing Rule”
(ECPR) sometimes used in regulation.11
Suppose that the VIM initially prices its downstream product at the monop-
oly price of $100. Suppose that the VIM produces an essential input at a
variable cost of $10 per unit and has downstream variable costs of $30 per
unit in addition to the costs of the input. Thus, the VIM has overall variable
costs of producing the downstream product of $40 per unit, which permits it
8 As the Court characterized the intent issue, “[T]he defendant’s unwillingness to renew the
ticket even if compensated at the retail price revealed a distinctly anticompetitive bent.” Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409 (2004).
9 Justice Breyer focused on this latter concern at the linkLine oral argument. He raised the
following question, based on the facts of Alcoa: “I mean, suppose you had no regulation at all
involved. Why couldn’t you have a monopolist at the primary stage, say, ingot, and what that
monopolist wants to do is to extend its power into the secondary stage, say, fabrication, in order
to make it less likely that there would be a new entries to attack its primary monopoly? That
would––suppose you have those circumstances? Perhaps they would be rare, but if you have
them, wouldn’t that set forth a Section 2 violation?” Transcript of Oral Argument at 10–11,
linkLine, 555 U.S. 438 (No. 07-512), available at http://www.supremecourt.gov/oral_arguments/
argument_transcripts/07-512.pdf. Justice Breyer subsequently answered his own question: “I al-
ways thought there were circumstances, whether true of Alcoa or not, where that did make out
the claim, namely, the one I suggested.” Id. at 13 (emphasis added). Then, in response to the
argument that the ingot monopolist has no duty to deal but has “the privilege to withdraw the
supply,” id. at 14, Justice Breyer replied, “Then I would say that shouldn’t be the law. The
reason it shouldn’t be the law is because that ingot [monopolist] may, by either withdrawing or,
in fact, raising his price way above a competitive level . . . is trying to drive out possible new
entrants into the ingot stage of the business. And the fabricators are a number one [entrant] out
there as possibilities to break down the monopolist in ingot.” Id.
10 The Commenters note the results of a “total welfare” versus “consumer welfare” standard.
See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 693, 700; Tardiff, supra note 3, at 726 n.23. There is an extensive
literature on the proper legal standard that need not be reviewed here. For my views, see Steven
C. Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, Effect on Consumers, and the Flawed Profit-Sacrifice Stan-
dard, 73 ANTITRUST L.J. 311, 329–31 (2006) [hereinafter Salop, Exclusionary Conduct]; and
Steven C. Salop, Question: What Is the Real and Proper Antitrust Welfare Standard? Answer:
The True Consumer Welfare Standard, 22 LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 336, 336 (2010).
11 See Salop, Refusals to Deal, supra note 4, at 719–20. R
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to earn a $60 margin on the downstream product before entry. Suppose that an
entrant into the downstream market appears on the scene and wishes to
purchase the essential input from the VIM. Suppose that the entrant offers a
price of $72 and, after extended negotiations, the VIM says that it would not
accept any price less than $90. Should the court conclude that the VIM has
refused to deal with the entrant or is engaging in a price squeeze? Suppose
that the VIM sells the input to other non-competing firms but is able to con-
vince the court that the prices it charges them should not be the basis for
evaluating allegations regarding the new entrant.12
If the VIM were to sell a unit of the input to the entrant at an input price of
$70, the VIM also would earn a margin of $60 (i.e., this input price less its
$10 input cost). The PPB price proposed in my article thus would be equal to
$70. If the VIM irrevocably refuses to accept an input price offer that exceeds
the PPB price of $70, as in the facts postulated above, that conduct would
constitute a refusal to deal. Similarly, setting an input price above $70, while
charging the monopoly retail price of $100, would constitute a price squeeze.
An equally efficient entrant (i.e., one with identical other downstream costs of
$30) selling a homogeneous product would be unable to survive at this “ex-
cessive” input price.13 Absent other competition, or other efficiency benefits,
this conduct would have anticompetitive effects. The VIM would be able to
maintain its retail price at the monopoly level, as well as help preserve its
input monopoly by reducing the likelihood of future entry there.
While the three Commenters focus on the areas in which we may differ, we
all agree with the application of the PPB in this paradigmatic scenario. This
exclusionary conduct by the monopolist would not only violate my PPB price
standard but it also would violate Professor Gilbert’s three alternative price
standards.14 It would not raise the administrability concerns raised by Dr. Sun
because there are homogeneous products.15 Because the entrant and the VIM
have the same technology, it also would not implicate the complications
raised by Dr. Tardiff.16
Consider next the following even more extreme hypothetical example of
exclusionary input pricing.17 Suppose that the VIM sets its wholesale price
12 For example, suppose that the sales to others are pursuant to long term contracts agreed to
many years ago or involve a somewhat different product. In these circumstances, the court might
conclude that selling to the entrant is feasible but that these market prices are not appropriate
pricing benchmarks.
13 The proper characterization of the conduct is that the input price is excessive, not that the
output price is too low or even predatory.
14 Gilbert, supra note 1, at 692–98.
15 Sun, supra note 2, at 705–07.
16 Tardiff, supra note 3, at 723–26.
17 See generally Salop, Refusals to Deal, supra note 4.
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above even its own retail price. Assuming the entrant and VIM use the input
in identical proportions and sell homogeneous products, it is obvious that this
price differential would involve profit-sacrifice and would not permit this
equally efficient entrant to survive. Yet it is also a fact that the VIM’s retail
price could be high enough to more than cover its own costs. This means that
it would not violate the below-cost pricing prong of the predatory pricing
standard set out in Brooke Group.18
The Supreme Court in linkLine took a very different, indeed, essentially
opposite position to this extreme example. It stated:
An upstream monopolist with no duty to deal is free to charge whatever
wholesale price it would like; antitrust law does not forbid lawfully obtained
monopolies from charging monopoly prices. . . . Similarly, the Sherman Act
does not forbid—indeed, it encourages— aggressive price competition at
the retail level, as long as the prices being charged are not predatory. . . . If
both the wholesale price and the retail price are independently lawful, there
is no basis for imposing antitrust liability simply because a vertically inte-
grated firm’s wholesale price happens to be greater than or equal to its
retail price.19
As discussed in my article, the Court’s reasoning is flawed.20 As an eco-
nomic matter, the high input price should not be treated as lawful. It destroys
competition, raises barriers to entry, and involves profit-sacrifice. In Trinko,
the Court cabined in refusal to deal claims primarily because of its legitimate
concern with administrability.21 However, this administrability concern is mis-
placed when there is a workable price standard like the PPB. In the quote
above, it is clearly administrable in the extreme scenario hypothesized by
Chief Justice Roberts.22 Any court competent to evaluate predatory pricing
claims under Brooke Group obviously would have no trouble determining
whether or not the VIM’s retail price is less than its wholesale price. Nor
18 Brooke Group Ltd. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 509 U.S. 209 (1993); see also
supra note 13.
19 Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 454–55 (2009) (Roberts, Ch.
J.) (emphasis added).
20 Salop, Refusals to Deal, supra note 4, at 721 n.50.
21 The Court also raised a caution regarding the impact on innovation incentives. Verizon
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407 (2004). In its
discussion, however, the Court failed to credit the innovation incentives benefits that arise from
the fact that the entrant is more likely to enter the upstream market if it can obtain a toehold in
the downstream market and the overarching fact that competition spurs innovation. See id. The
Court also raised a caution regarding the potential for collusion. Id. at 408. But, neither of these
concerns was likely to have been the key issue because the same concerns would arise if there
had been a previous voluntary course of dealing. Indeed, fear of collusion and reduced innova-
tion incentives would be more significant in this case.
22 linkLine, 555 U.S. at 454–55 (Roberts, Ch. J.). Nor does the freedom promised in Colgate
apply when there is a “purpose to create or maintain a monopoly.” United States v. Colgate &
Co., 250 U.S. 300, 307 (1919).
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would a court competent to evaluate predatory pricing claims under Brooke
Group find it difficult to evaluate whether the PPB is violated when the prod-
ucts are homogeneous. The PPB involves nothing more than a comparison of
the VIM’s prices and costs.
More fundamentally, the Court should not have analyzed this price squeeze
allegation through the predatory pricing lens. The key economic issue for
evaluating competitive effects is not that the VIM allegedly is arguably charg-
ing a retail price that is too low or predatory. To the contrary, the fundamental
concern involves the fact that the VIM is setting an exclusionary high input
price.
Conduct that raises rivals’ costs by charging high input prices raises greater
antitrust concerns than does charging low output prices that allegedly are
predatory.23 Predatory pricing allegations raise fewer concerns for several rea-
sons: because consumers benefit from the alleged exclusionary conduct dur-
ing the predatory phase; because the conduct sacrifices profits during the
predatory phase; and, because the firm may be unable to recoup these losses
during the predatory phase, in that the victim may not exit the market or other
firms will expand when it tries to raise price.
In contrast, exclusionary conduct that raises the costs of competitors is
more likely to succeed and consumers are more likely to be harmed for sev-
eral reasons: because conduct that raises rivals’ costs will lead to higher prices
immediately, so that recoupment will occur simultaneously with the exclu-
sionary phase; because the victim firm will raise price even if it does not exit,
so that the conduct can lead to market power even in the absence of exit; and,
because consumers will be harmed from those higher prices immediately, so
there are no inherent short-term consumer benefits, as there are in predatory
pricing. Because of these significant differences, raising rivals’ costs and
predatory pricing represent two distinct paradigms for the antitrust treatment
of exclusionary conduct.24
I. COMMENTERS’ DISAGREEMENTS
I now turn to the areas in which the Commenters disagree with the analysis
in my article. All three Commenters support the use of the PPB price standard
in the situation where the excluded competitor has an identical technology and
the two companies sell a homogeneous product. However, they take issue
with the PPB when the entrant is more efficient, where it produces a differen-
tiated product, or where its technology uses the input differentially from the
VIM. Dr. Sun and Dr. Tardiff focus on administrability and calculation con-
23 See Salop, Exclusionary Conduct, supra note 10, at 315–18.
24 Id.
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cerns in more complex fact situations. Professor Gilbert focuses on the bench-
mark itself.
A. THE ENTRANT IS A MORE EFFICIENT COMPETITOR
Suppose that the VIM and the entrant produce a homogenous product and
each uses the same amount of the input in each unit of output. But suppose
that the entrant has lower incremental costs for producing the downstream
product than does the VIM. This is entry that antitrust law should wish to
encourage. It has the potential to lead to particularly intense price competition
in the downstream market that directly benefits consumers and induces the
VIM to innovate to reduce its own costs. It also may lead to entry into the
input market and thus competition for the monopoly input.
The PPB standard would force the VIM not to exceed the break-even price
for an equally efficient competitor. This would permit the entrant to earn a
margin over its costs at the VIM’s pre-entry, monopoly retail price. As a re-
sult, it likely would induce the desired price competition and innovation. Ab-
sent the PPB, the VIM would like to charge a higher wholesale price, perhaps
one so high that it would lead the entrant to break-even at a retail price equal
to the VIM’s pre-entry retail price, if not higher. That higher wholesale price
would allow the VIM to extract some or all of the benefits of the entrant’s
greater efficiency. Relative to the PPB standard, the higher wholesale price
would benefit the VIM but would harm consumers in the process. The PPB
standard would not permit a wholesale price that extracts some but not all of
the entrant’s greater efficiency. To do so would reduce the amount of price
competition.
This PPB would not violate Professor Gilbert’s alternative metrics in this
scenario. As discussed in more detail below, Professor Gilbert’s metrics set a
different legal standard for determining whether or not there is a refusal to
deal by the VIM. Professor Gilbert focuses on the case of differentiated prod-
ucts. But, his metrics also can be applied to the case of a more efficient en-
trant selling a homogeneous product. His metrics would permit the VIM to
charge an input price above the PPB in order to extract the entrant’s greater
efficiency. However, a higher input price would reduce or even eliminate any
consumer welfare-enhancing price competition.
This result can be illustrated with a numerical example that follows from
the example set out above.25 Suppose now that the entrant is more efficient,
with downstream costs of $20, whereas the VIM has downstream costs of
$30. In this situation, a VIM that did not intend to destroy the entrant would
25 Professor Gilbert uses the same example but reaches a different policy conclusion because
his legal standard is different. See Gilbert, supra note 1, at 692 n.15.
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have the incentive to charge an input price of $80, exceeding the $70 PPB. If
demand were inelastic at this price, Professor Gilbert’s metrics would permit
the VIM to charge the $80 input price.
At this higher input price, the entrant would capture the entire market at a
retail price of $100. Thus, the retail price would remain the same as the pre-
entry price level. At this retail price of $100 and input price of $80, the VIM
would earn a margin on its input sales equal to $70 (i.e., 80-10) per unit on the
pre-entry level of sales. Relative to no entry, this would increase efficiency
because the more efficient entrant would produce the output instead of the less
efficient VIM. However, because the retail price would remain the same, con-
sumers would obtain no benefits at all.26
In contrast, suppose that the VIM were required to offer the input at a price
no higher than the PPB price of $70. In this situation, the entrant would have
costs of $90, not $100. If the VIM charges $100, the entrant would have the
incentive to charge a retail price just (barely) below the VIM’s retail price of
$100 and it would capture the entire market. In this case, the VIM would earn
the margin of $60 (i.e., 70-10) on the demand D(100), if the retail demand
were elastic and given by the demand curve D(P).
However, a foresighted VIM would not passively accept the entrant captur-
ing the entire market at this $100 price. A rational VIM would realize that it
could cut its retail price in order to induce the entrant to further cut its own
price. In this way, the VIM could induce the entrant to charge a lower retail
price, where the VIM would make more input sales at the $60 margin from
the PPB, assuming some demand elasticity.27 For example, suppose that the
VIM were to cut its price and charge (say) $98. If the entrant did not undercut
the VIM, the VIM would capture the market and its profits would fall. But the
more efficient entrant would have the incentive to further undercut the VIM
and charge a lower price of (say) $97. In this way, the VIM would sell more
units of the input.
The VIM would have the incentive to cut its retail price down to (slightly
more than) $90. In the limit, the entrant would undercut to charge a retail
26 This discussion implicitly assumes perfectly inelastic demand. If demand has some elastic-
ity, the VIM would choose a somewhat lower input price, but one that generally exceeds the
PPB. For example, if the VIM acquired the entrant, its variable costs would fall from $40 down
to $30. If the VIM faced a linear demand curve, for example, this $10 variable cost reduction
would lead the VIM to reduce its retail price by half the cost decrease, from $100 down to $95.
Absent the acquisition, Professor Gilbert’s VIM could achieve the same outcome by charging an
input price equal to $75.
27 This assumes that demand is not perfectly inelastic.
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price of (virtually) $90.28 The VIM now would sell D(90) units of the input
and earn a margin of $60 on each unit.29 Thus, the VIM’s profits would be
higher than if it ceded the entire market to the entrant at the retail price of
$100 because it would be selling more units of the input at the $70 PPB input
price.30 If the VIM continues to lower its price until the entrant’s price is
driven down (virtually to or) equal to its costs of $90, consumers also would
gain. Consumers would benefit because price would be lower (i.e., virtually
$90 instead of $100) and total output would be higher.31
In summary, Professor Gilbert’s first two metrics would permit the VIM to
charge a higher input price (of $75 or even $80 in the example) to a more
efficient entrant.32 But these alternative metrics would lead to lower consumer
welfare than does the PPB. In this situation, market efficiency under Professor
Gilbert’s metrics also would be lower than achieved by the PPB because mar-
ket output is lower and prices are further in excess of costs.
This analysis might raise the question of whether the VIM’s retail price
reductions might be viewed as predatory. However, this strategy of cutting its
output price in order to induce the entrant to lower its price to meet (and beat)
the lower price competition does not involve profit-sacrifice.33 The lower
price would maximize the VIM’s profits, given the PPB pricing constraint.
The lower price also would not entail below-cost pricing that might violate the
Brooke Group standard. In the example, a $90 retail price still would remain
far above the VIM’s variable costs of $40. When there are differentiated prod-
28 The VIM realizes that if it sets any price Pvim >90, then the more efficient entrant would
have the incentive to charge a slightly lower price Pvim – e, where e>0 is small. In the limit, the
VIM can induce the entrant to charge a price virtually equal to $90.
29 The $90 output price likely also is lower than the price the VIM likely would have charged
if it had acquired the entrant instead of attempting to destroy it, as explained in note 19 supra and
accompanying text. With linear demand, the VIM would have charged a retail price of $95.
30 Professor Gilbert’s Appendix assumes differentiated products, not homogeneous products,
so it does not really apply to this scenario. Gilbert, supra note 1, at 701. However, the underlying
model seems to contemplate a simple Nash equilibrium where the VIM and the entrant set their
prices simultaneously. In contrast, the VIM modeled here sets its price, anticipating the response
of the more efficient entrant. As a dominant firm, the VIM would have that capability and incen-
tive to take the entrant’s response into account, particularly if the PPB standard applied.
31 As another example, suppose that the VIM faced entry by two homogeneous entrants, each
with downstream costs of $20. In that scenario, the post-entry competitive retail price would
equal the input price plus $20. Thus, under the PPB, the retail price would be $90. In contrast, if
the VIM charged an input price of $80, the retail price would be $100. If the VIM charged an
input price of $75, the retail price would be $95. This example was suggested by Professor
Gilbert in our correspondence.
32 In a private communication, Professor Gilbert has said that his third metric produces a
benchmark price less than or equal to $80 in this example and could be less than the PPB of $70
if demand is sufficiently elastic.
33 The price cuts by the sophisticated VIM raise an interesting issue about profit sacrifice. The
VIM would be sacrificing profits if it actually captured the retail market. But, it does not. Know-
ing that the more efficient entrant will undercut it, the VIM is actually maximizing profits.
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ucts, there similarly could be price responses, as sketched out in Dr. Tardiff’s
comment. In his interesting analysis, Dr. Tardiff suggests that these price re-
sponses would not lead to the VIM violating the price squeeze standard.34
Dr. Sun stresses administrability concerns in his Comment. In this regard,
the use of Professor Gilbert’s alternative metrics lead to a potential adminis-
trability concern in the situation (that he does not analyze), where the en-
trant’s costs are different from the VIM’s and its costs are not common
knowledge. A VIM that wants to demand a higher input price can merely
claim that it believes that the entrant is more efficient than is the VIM. Absent
further information, any input price could be defended on this basis. In order
to evaluate the VIM’s claim in court, the court would need to determine the
VIM’s expectation of the entrant’s costs and the reasonableness of this
expectation.35
The PPB standard avoids this administrability issue because it involves
only a comparison of the VIM’s prices and costs. This is similar to the ap-
proach in predatory pricing cases. Although some commentators may suggest
that the goal of the price/cost comparison is a desire to protect the potential
for entry by an equally efficient competitor, that consideration is not the driv-
ing force. Entry into a monopoly market by a less efficient competitor also
will cause prices to fall below the monopoly level and consumers to benefit.
Instead, the fundamental rationale of the below-cost pricing prong is to serve
as a bright line test of whether or not the defendant’s pricing reveals an “an-
ticompetitive bent,” as the Court phrased the issue in Trinko.36
B. DIFFERENTIATED PRODUCTS
When the products of the VIM and the entrant are differentiated, but the
two firms have identical costs and the same per unit input usage, the concept
of an equally efficient competitor becomes a knottier issue. The entrant is
seen as more efficient by the consumers that prefer its product at equal prices,
while the VIM is considered more efficient by the consumers that prefer its
product at equal prices. Competitive interaction also is somewhat more com-
plicated when the products are differentiated.
In this scenario, if the VIM charges an input price equal to the $70 PPB
price that would occur when the products were homogeneous, the entrant will
have variable costs of $100 and will charge a price above $100. However,
34 Tardiff, supra note 3, at 725–26.
35 A similar issue can arise in bundled discount cases. See, for example, Cascade Health
Solutions v. PeaceHealth, 515 F.3d 883, 905 (9th Cir. 2008), as noted by Sun, supra note 2, at
706.
36 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 409
(2004).
710 ANTITRUST LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 79
because its product is differentiated, the entrant will be able to earn a positive
margin and survive.37 The entry may lead the VIM to lower or raise its own
retail price, depending on the effect of the entry on its elasticity of demand.
However, that entry likely raises consumer welfare.
This PPB of $70 does not properly reflect the VIM’s opportunity cost of
selling the input rather than selling the downstream output itself. Because the
products are differentiated, if the VIM sells one more unit of the input to the
entrant, it would not lose an entire unit of output. Some of the entrant’s incre-
mental sales would come at the expense of other products. In order to equalize
the VIM’s margin from selling the input to the new competitor and its oppor-
tunity cost of selling the downstream output itself, the PPB would be deter-
mined as follows:38
PPB = VIM’s input cost + Div x [VIM’s retail price – VIM’s input
and other downstream cost]
To illustrate, suppose that we have the previous $100 retail price, VIM input
cost of $10 and VIM other downstream cost of $30. Suppose further that the
diversion ratio (Div) between the VIM’s and entrant’s cost is 90 percent. With
these facts, the PPB would be $64 (i.e., $10 + 90% x ($100 - $40) = $64),
instead of the $70 PPB that obtained when the products were assumed to be
homogenous. This PPB would lead to more price competition than would the
$70 input price.
Product differentiation increases the complexity of the analysis in several
ways. It implicates the issue of the proper metric, as stressed by Professor
Gilbert, and discussed above with respect to the case of the more efficient
entrant. It also raises an administrability issue, as stressed by Dr. Sun. It also
raises an issue of the applicability of the analysis when the products are not
close substitutes, as noted by both Professor Gilbert and Dr. Sun. I will dis-
cuss each of these issues in turn. Product differentiation also raises the issue
of the price responses by the VIM, as noted by Dr. Tardiff and as I have
already discussed above.
1. The Proper Antitrust Price Benchmark
Professor Gilbert’s analysis of differentiated products raises the same issue
about the proper price benchmark that was discussed above with respect to the
scenario of the more efficient entrant that produces a homogenous product.
The PPB standard does not permit the VIM to choose the input price that
37 This assumes that the entrant has zero or sufficiently low fixed costs, an assumption the
Commenters and I have made for most of our comparative analysis.
38 See Salop, Refusals to Deal, supra note 4, at 729.
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would be chosen by a hypothetical VIM that does not intend to deter the entry
of the entrant, but has the goal of raising the entrant’s costs in order to main-
tain a higher downstream price.39 Professor Gilbert’s metric would permit the
VIM legally to raise rivals’ costs in order to maintain its monopoly power. In
my view, this exclusionary conduct should not be lawful, even if it is rational
for the hypothetical VIM that Professor Gilbert considers.40 The incentive of
this hypothetical VIM to raise its competitor’s cost reduces consumer welfare,
even if it would not cause the entrant to exit or be fully deterred from entering
the downstream market.
The PPB intentionally does not “protect” the VIM from the reduction in
profits that flows from post-entry price competition between the VIM and the
entrant. The PPB only compensates the VIM for the lost profits on sales lost
to the competitor. It does not compensate the VIM for the reduced profits
from the lower price on the sales it retains after the entry. This is because this
latter component of the profit reduction results from price competition that the
antitrust laws should encourage.
In Trinko, the Court raised the concern that “[t]he opportunity to charge
monopoly prices––at least for a short period––is what attracts ‘business acu-
men’ in the first place [because] it induces risk taking that produces innova-
tion and economic growth.”41 That is the rationale for compensating the VIM
for the opportunity cost of output sales lost from supplying the input to the
entrant. But there is also the parallel risk that overly permissive Section 2
standards might reduce the monopolist’s incentives to innovate and invest. As
Judge Hand recognized in Alcoa, “Immunity from competition is a narcotic,
and rivalry is a stimulant, to industrial progress.”42
A comprehensive economic analysis must also consider the effects on the
incentives of the VIM’s rivals as well as the VIM in order to evaluate the
likely effect on consumers. The PPB was formulated to strike the proper bal-
ance among these long run incentive issues along with the direct impact of the
conduct on short-term consumer welfare. For this reason, the PPB does not
compensate the VIM for the impact of price competition on its profits. In this
way, the PPB standard protects consumers and the competitive process. The
39 In Professor Gilbert’s equation (A.1), the last term on the right-hand side expresses the
impact of the “rais[ing] rivals’ costs” goal on the profit-maximizing input price. Gilbert, supra
note 1, at 702.
40 Dr. Sun runs simulations that show that the ECPR better reflects the incentives of Professor
Gilbert’s hypothetical VIM than does the PPB. See Sun, supra note 2, 709–13. However, these
simulations are not on point, in my view, because the incentives of the hypothetical VIM do not
signal wise antitrust policy.
41 Verizon Commc’ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398, 407
(2004).
42 United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 427 (2d Cir. 1945).
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antitrust laws are designed for the protection of consumers and the competi-
tive process, not monopolists.
2. Highly Differentiated Non-Competing Products
Professor Gilbert criticizes the use of the PPB when products are differenti-
ated for another reason. The calculation of the PPB could lead to anomalous
results if the products were so highly differentiated that they would be viewed
as essentially non-competitive. For example, as Professor Gilbert points out, if
the diversion ratio between the two products were zero, then the PPB would
equal the VIM’s input cost.43 I agree that a court should not apply these re-
fusal to deal and price squeeze standards to a VIM’s sales to a customer that
does not compete with the VIM. In that situation, the VIM would have no
anticompetitive incentive to exclude the entrant. For the same reason, how-
ever, the fact that the PPB equals cost does not raise any practical, real world
concerns. Because the products are not competing, the VIM could not be
found liable for using the refusal to deal or price squeeze to maintain its
monopoly.
This practical point is recognized by both Dr. Sun and Dr. Tardiff, who
note that there can only be antitrust liability where the firms are sufficiently
close competitors.44 Thus, in order to prevail, the plaintiff must show that the
entrant and VIM are close enough substitutes to be viewed as substantial com-
petitors in the same market. In my view, a reasonable starting point would
require a showing of a diversion ratio of 80 to 90 percent.45 As a result, this
potential anomaly actually would not raise significant practical concerns.
3. Administrability Concerns
There is a more significant administrability issue because the degree of
product differentiation would have to be gauged by the VIM and the court.
Dr. Sun correctly points out that it sometimes may be difficult for the VIM or
the court to estimate the degree of product differentiation. This is a particular
concern if the entrant’s product does not even exist at the time it approaches
the VIM, so that the degree of differentiation is still unclear and there are no
market shares that can be used to estimate proportional diversion.46 Antitrust
also may not wish to encourage the entrant and the VIM to discuss the en-
trant’s new product. I agree that this is a valid concern.
43 Gilbert, supra note 1, at 694 n.22. R
44 See Sun, supra note 2, at 705; Tardiff, supra note 3, at 722 n.8 (citing PHILLIP E. AREEDA &
HERBERT HOVENKAMP, FUNDAMENTALS OF ANTITRUST LAW 7-83 to 7-85 (4th ed. 2011)).
45 Salop, Refusals to Deal, supra note 4, at 731.
46 See Sun, supra note 2, at 705.
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Dr. Sun suggests that the court should use a PPB standard based on the
assumption of homogeneous products in order to deal with this informational
issue. While this homogenous product PPB standard is the simplest option and
has these advantages, it is not necessarily the only or best option in every
case. Sometimes the rate of differentiation will be known in advance by both
parties. Where the diversion ratio is not known, a court might apply a pre-
sumption that the products are modestly differentiated instead of the more
extreme assumption of perfect homogeneity. Because few products in the
modern economy are perfectly homogeneous, this might provide a more accu-
rate estimate and lead to a more procompetitive outcome for consumers.
B. DIFFERENTIAL INPUT USAGE
Dr. Tardiff raises the issue that the VIM and the entrant may have different
per unit usage of the VIM’s input.47 This differential usage raises a complexity
that I did not consider in my analysis of the PPB. Suppose that the entrant and
the VIM sell a homogeneous product. However, suppose now that the entrant
uses the input less intensely than does the VIM. For example, suppose that the
entrant uses one-half of one unit of the input for every unit of output, whereas
the VIM uses one unit of the input for every unit of the output. In this situa-
tion, the PPB would be adjusted upwards to reflect the VIM’s opportunity
cost of selling the input instead of the downstream output.
As noted by Dr. Tardiff, this adjustment can have a substantial effect on the
PPB level. In extreme cases, it could even lead to a nominal PPB that exceeds
the retail price.48 To illustrate, suppose that the entrant has half the per-unit
usage as the VIM. In that situation, the PPB would rise from $70 per unit up
to $130 per unit in the basic example we have been discussing. By selling one
unit of output at $100, the VIM would earn a margin $60. In order to recover
this $60 from selling one-half unit of the input to the entrant, the VIM would
need to charge a price of $65 for the half-unit (which has a cost of $5), or
$130 per whole unit.49 Thus, the adjustment of the PPB for differential input
usage is simple to make. The relevant PPB for the half-unit would be $65
when the retail monopoly price is $100.
However, despite this higher input price, an otherwise equally efficient
competitor would not be deterred from entering the market. It would still have
lower per unit costs than the VIM as a result of its increased usage efficiency.
The entrant specifically would have costs of $95, comprised of $65 for the
one-half unit of the input plus the $30 other costs. This is less than the $100
47 Tardiff, supra note 3, at 723–24.
48 This is not applicable to the language in the linkLine opinion because there was equal usage
of the input. Pac. Bell Tel. Co. v. linkLine Commc’ns, Inc., 555 U.S. 438, 442 (2009).
49 Tardiff, supra note 3, at 724.
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per unit cost of the equally efficient entrant selling a homogeneous product.
Thus, the analysis of the more efficient entrant discussed above would apply.
As further noted by Dr. Tardiff, this adjustment also raises an adminis-
trability issue. This issue is analogous to the administrability issue of the more
efficient competitor discussed above. A VIM could defend its setting an ex-
cessively high input price on the grounds that it expected the entrant to be a
more efficient user of the input. As discussed above, it might be difficult for a
court to evaluate this claim. I agree that this provides a reasonable adminis-
trability rationale for presuming equal usage intensity of the input by the en-
trant and the VIM.50
II. CONCLUSION
While we disagree on some issues, we all seem to agree that per se legality
is not the appropriate legal rule for alleged refusals to deal and price squeezes.
We also all agree that there are administrable price standards that can be used
to aid courts in these exclusionary conduct cases. We also all support the use
of the PPB standard when it is equal to the ECPR, as occurs when the entrant
sells a homogenous product and produces with equal input usage and equal
costs. Where we differ is the implementation of the price benchmark in situa-
tions where the entrant is more efficient, or where the entrant sells a differen-
tiated product, or where input usage differs. In light of the extreme current
stance of the Supreme Court in Trinko and linkLine, I believe that our agree-
ments are far more germane and significant than are our disagreements about
implementation of the proper price benchmark.
50 The equality presumption is the first part of Dr. Tardiff’s two-part recommendation. In the
second part, he proposes a more detailed examination that could result in an adjustment to the
input price. See id.
